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AbstrACt
Introduction Generating country-level political 
commitment will be critical to driving forward action 
throughout the United Nations Decade of Action on 
Nutrition (2016–2025). In this review of the empirical 
nutrition policy literature, we ask: what factors generate, 
sustain and constrain political commitment for nutrition, 
how and under what circumstances? Our aim is to inform 
strategic ‘commitment-building’ actions.
Method We adopted a framework synthesis method and 
realist review protocol. An initial framework was derived 
from relevant theory and then populated with empirical 
evidence to test and modify it. Five steps were undertaken: 
initial theoretical framework development; search for 
relevant empirical literature; study selection and quality 
appraisal; data extraction, analysis and synthesis and 
framework modification.
results 75 studies were included. We identified 18 factors 
that drive commitment, organised into five categories: 
actors; institutions; political and societal contexts; 
knowledge, evidence and framing; and, capacities and 
resources. Irrespective of country-context, effective 
nutrition actor networks, strong leadership, civil society 
mobilisation, supportive political administrations, societal 
change and focusing events, cohesive and resonant 
framing, and robust data systems and available evidence 
were commitment drivers. Low-income and middle-income 
country studies also frequently reported international 
actors, empowered institutions, vertical coordination and 
capacities and resources. In upper-middle-income and 
high-income country studies, private sector interference 
frequently undermined commitment.
Conclusion Political commitment is not something that 
simply exists or emerges accidentally; it can be created 
and strengthened over time through strategic action. 
Successfully generating commitment will likely require 
a core set of actions with some context-dependent 
adaptations. Ultimately, it will necessitate strategic 
actions by cohesive, resourced and strongly led nutrition 
actor networks that are responsive to the multifactorial, 
multilevel and dynamic political systems in which they 
operate and attempt to influence. Accelerating the 
formation and effectiveness of such networks over the 
Nutrition Decade should be a core task for all actors 
involved.
IntroduCtIon
Malnutrition—‘an abnormal physiological 
condition caused by inadequate, unbalanced 
or excessive consumption of macronutrients 
and/or micronutrients'1, p53—is a leading 
driver of global death and disability. In 2014, 
462 million adults were underweight, 2 billion 
micronutrient deficient and 1.9 billion over-
weight or obese.2 In 2016, stunting (low 
height for age) affected 155 million children 
under 5 years of age, wasting (low weight 
for height) 52 million and overweight (high 
weight for height) a further 41 million.3 In 
2011, nutrition-related factors contributed to 
3.1 million or 45% of all deaths in children 
under 5 years of age.3 In short, malnutrition 
affects one in three people in the world and 
leaves no nation untouched.4 
The global nutrition situation is becoming 
more complex. Rapid nutritional change in 
many countries is precipitating a ‘double-
burden’ of malnutrition, with high rates of 
undernutrition coexisting with overweight, 
obesity and diet-related non-communicable 
diseases (NCDs) within populations, house-
holds and individuals.4 5 People who are 
malnourished are more likely to die younger, 
suffer disability, live in poverty, have impaired 
physical and cognitive development and 
reduced performance at school and work.4 
Conversely, good nutrition provides a bedrock 
for the economic and social development of 
nations; all of the Sustainable Development 
Goals both influence, and are influenced by, 
nutrition.
Global-level ambition for tackling ‘malnu-
trition in all its forms’ is strong. The decla-
ration of 2016–2025 as the United Nations 
Decade of Action on Nutrition (the Nutri-
tion Decade) and the positioning of nutri-
tion within Sustainable Development Goal 2 
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(Target 2.2 is ending all forms of malnutrition by 2030) 
are testament to this. These build on the World Health 
Assembly’s six targets on maternal, infant and young child 
nutrition and targets on diet-related NCDs (together, the 
‘global targets’). The technical solutions for achieving 
these goals and targets exist, including nutrition-specific 
and nutrition-sensitive interventions that are cost-effec-
tive and backed by evidence.6
Converting global ambition into on-the-ground 
reductions in malnutrition will, however, require more 
than technical know-how. It will also demand political 
commitment for the sustained mobilisation of national 
and subnational political systems, policy processes and 
resources for improved nutrition.4 7–9 The Global Nutri-
tion Report and other monitoring efforts reveal the scope 
of this challenge—some countries are making progress 
towards achieving the global targets (particularly on child 
stunting and wasting), but the large majority are off-track 
due to shortfalls in governance, policy and program-
ming responses.4 10 In essence, there is a significant gap 
between current levels of commitment and that needed 
to drive coherent action for achieving results.4
A growing body of empirical research, much of it 
grounded in political science, describes why and how 
nutrition has come to receive political commitment in 
some jurisdictions but has been neglected or system-
atically ignored in others. Important reviews of this 
literature exist, focusing on specific nutrition issues or 
country-contexts.8 9 11 12 With an aim of informing commit-
ment-building actions over the Nutrition Decade, we 
extend this earlier work by reviewing and synthesising the 
literature relevant to all forms of malnutrition and coun-
try-contexts. We ask the question: what factors generate, 
sustain and constrain political commitment for nutrition 
within countries, how and under what circumstances?
defining political commitment
We adopt a definition of political commitment as 'the 
intent and sustained actions over time by societal actors 
to achieve the objective of reducing and eliminating the 
manifestations and causes of (malnutrition)'.13p282 Or 
more simply, it is ‘the will to act and keep on acting until 
the job is done’.7pXIV From this perspective, achieving 
political commitment is more than generating attention 
to malnutrition or getting it onto a government agenda. 
It further involves the mobilisation of political systems 
and institutions, adopting policies, allocating resources 
and coordinating responses for as long as necessary to 
ensure results.7 9 13–15
Five inter-related forms of commitment can be iden-
tified in the literature on nutrition’s political economy 
(table 1). Commitment-building, the non-linear and 
dynamic process by which commitment is generated,7 
occurs through the deliberate actions of nutrition actor 
networks —the individuals and organisations operating 
within a jurisdiction with a shared interest in attenuating 
malnutrition and who act collectively to do so.9 15 Such 
networks may be considered effective when they are 
capable of generating and sustaining rhetorical, insti-
tutional and operational forms of commitment, lever-
aging embedded commitments and ultimately achieving 
commitment that is system-wide.15
MetHods
review method
We made several considerations in selecting the review 
method: the complex nature of political systems, the 
theoretically guided qualitative case study designs typi-
cally used in food and nutrition political analyses, and 
our aim of describing the multifactorial, interdependent 
and context-dependent drivers of political commitment 
rather than a simple description of listed variables. On this 
basis, we adopted a framework synthesis method16 17 suit-
able for reviewing qualitative research on applied policy 
topics, and adapted the Realist And Meta-narrative 
Evidence Synthesis: Evolving Standards (RAMESES) 
standards for reporting purposes.18 19
Key questions
What is already known about this topic?
 ► Global-level ambition for tackling ‘malnutrition in all its forms’ 
is strong—the 2016–2025 United Nations Decade of Action on 
Nutrition (the Nutrition Decade) is testament to this.
 ► However, without political commitment at the country-level the 
policies, programmes and resources required to reduce and 
eliminate malnutrition in all its forms are unlikely to be adopted, 
effectively implemented and sustained.
 ► Recent advances in the political economy of nutrition literature 
reveal a complex web of factors that drive political commitment 
across different country contexts and forms of malnutrition. An 
in-depth understanding of these factors can inform strategic 
‘commitment-building’ actions over the Nutrition Decade.
What are the new findings?
 ► In this review of the empirical nutrition policy literature, we ask 
the question: what factors generate, sustain and constrain political 
commitment for nutrition within countries, how and under what 
circumstances?
 ► Overall, 18 factors were identified and organised into five 
categories: actors; institutions; political and societal contexts; 
knowledge, evidence and framing; and capacities and resources.
 ► The identified factors were strongly interdependent and context-
dependent, supporting the need to understand the drivers of 
political commitment within a non-linear and dynamic model of 
change.
How might this impact practice?
 ► Effective strategies for generating and sustaining political 
commitment over the Nutrition Decade are likely to involve a set of 
core actions but with some context-dependent adaptations.
 ► Ultimately, sustained actions by cohesive, responsive and strongly 
led nutrition actor networks with the strategic and organisational 
capacities for effective commitment-building are needed.
 ► Accelerating the development of such networks should be a core 
task for all actors involved, including international development 
partners. 
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This involved formulating a theoretical framework 
of factors influencing political commitment and modi-
fying it in response to extracted data to result in a 
revised framework including modified and new factors. 
We proceeded via five steps: (i) development of a 
framework integrating several theories on the determi-
nants of political commitment; (ii) a search for relevant 
empirical literature; (iii) study selection and quality 
appraisal; (iv) extraction, analysis and synthesis of data 
and (v) population and modification of the frame-
work. A review protocol was registered (PROSPERO 
2016:CRD42016046015).
Initial theoretical framework development
A scoping review of scholarly and grey literature was 
undertaken in July 2016 to identify relevant theories, 
to explicate the phenomena under study and identify 
search terms. To guide our initial conceptualisation and 
to guide the analysis, we drew on three complementary 
‘middle-range’ theories often applied in the political 
economy of nutrition literature: Kingdon’s multiple 
streams theory,20 Shiffman and Smith’s health priori-
ty-setting framework14 and Heaver’s work on political 
commitment for nutrition.7 These were integrated into 
an initial theoretical framework (see online supple-
mentary text 1).
search for relevant empirical literature
To optimise search strings, we undertook preliminary 
searches of the PubMed, Scopus, ProQuest and Web 
of Science databases using combinations of terms and 
database parameters (table 2). These databases were 
selected for their relevance and comprehensiveness 
after consultation with two librarians trained in system-
atic search. A search diary was kept to record progress 
and modifications to the protocol (see online supple-
mentary text 2). We conducted a search for primary 
literature between August and October 2016. Acknowl-
edging the large practice-orientated grey literature on 
the political economy of nutrition, we also searched the 
websites of international organisations with a mandate 
to address malnutrition in October 2016 (table 2). To 
capture studies missed in the initial search, additional 
searches were conducted in February 2017.
selecting studies and quality appraisal
References for all studies were entered into an EndNote 
library. Studies were selected against the inclusion and 
Table 1 Five forms of political commitment
Form Description
[1] Rhetorical commitment Statements made by members of the executive and legislative branches of government, and/
or those outside of government with whom they are closely associated (eg, donors, civil society 
leaders) recognising malnutrition as a serious problem, and that concerted action is both needed 
and forthcoming.7 15 20 24 51 A rhetorical commitment may be a ‘symbolic gesture’ only, especially 
when the political costs of inaction are low. Or, when genuine, such commitments may reach a 
government’s ‘decision-agenda’ and be converted into [2] via directives for governmental and 
societal action.
[2] Institutional commitment The conversion of [1] into substantive policy infrastructure including institutions responsible 
for coordinating actions, the adoption of enabling legislation, policies and policy instruments 
commensurate with the severity of the problem,24 51 and the commitment of mid-level 
bureaucrats responsible for coordinating action.7 24 73 Institutions and policies can, however, be 
underpowered, inadequately resourced and have limited impact. This can trap nutrition in a ‘low-
priority cycle' as ‘lack of commitment breeds lack of impact breeds lack of commitment’.8,p7
[3] Operational commitment The conversion of [1] + [2] into on-the-ground actions including the sustained allocation of 
human, technical and financial resources, the effective coordination of all actors involved along 
national to subnational implementation pathways and the commitment of street-level managers 
and implementation teams.24 51 52 Limited operational commitment can lead to implementation 
failure, thereby undermining sustained commitment and further trapping nutrition in a low-
priority cycle.7
[4] Embedded commitment When commitment to address issues indirectly related to nutrition (eg, economic development, 
social protection, hunger reduction initiatives) inadvertently achieves positive nutrition 
outcomes, referred to as ‘nutrition success without nutrition-specific action’.53p26 This can create 
opportunities for nutrition actors when they are capable of sensitising or positioning nutrition 
within these broader or related policy agendas, thus further catalysing the commitment-building 
process and forms.1–3 52 53
[5] System-wide 
commitment
The achievement of [1]+[2]+[3]+[4] involving all actors operating within a nutrition system 
including communities, families and individual citizens.7 15 When achieved, system-wide 
commitment can create a powerful reinforcing feedback-loop that institutionalises and sustains 
long-term policy and programme responses. To be effective, efforts must be sustained and 
recalibrated in response to emerging opposition and demands, changing conditions and 
implementation challenges.7 13 15
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Table 2 Databases and websites searched, search terms and inclusion/exclusion criteria
Search Databases/institutional websites Search terms
Scholarly 
literature
PubMed, Scopus, ProQuest, Web of Science Nutrition-related: diet*, food*, hunger, 
micronutrient deficienc*, nourish*, *nutrition*, 
obesity, overweight, stunting, underweight, 
wasting
Political commitment related: accountabilit*, 
advoca*, agenda*, capacit*, collective action, 
commit*, coordination, enabling environment*, 
govern*, politic*, policy, policies, priorit*, 
stewardship, strateg*
Grey literature Eldis; Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations; Institute for Development Studies; International 
Food Policy Research Institute; International Fund for 
Agricultural Development; Oxfam International; Save the 
Children; Scaling-up Nutrition; United Nations Children’s 
Fund; United Nations Standing Committee on Nutrition; 
World Bank; World Food Programme; World Health 
Organization.
Inclusion and exclusion criteria
  Studies were 
included if:
1. Published after 1990 in English.
2. Published in a peer-reviewed journal or by an official organisation or non-government organisation with a 
mandate to address malnutrition.
3. Identified and described factors shaping political commitment for nutrition at national and/or subnational 
levels.
4. Involved an empirical analysis with clearly described aims, explicit use of theory or description of 
underlying assumptions, a clear study design and methodology including data sources, coherent 
statement of findings and justifiable conclusions.
  Studies were 
excluded if:
1. Non-empirical (eg, commentaries, conceptual frameworks, calls to action).
2. Focused on specific institutional (eg, school, prisons and workplaces) or clinical policy-settings (ie, not 
at jurisdictional level).
*Truncated to capture all variations of the word (eg, *nutrition* captures malnutrition, overnutrition and undernutrition).
Figure 1 The search process.
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exclusion criteria in table 2. Study quality was appraised 
by relevance to the review aim (inclusion criterion 3) 
and robustness (inclusion criterion 4). A diagram of the 
search process is given in figure 1. To check for interas-
sessor reliability, PB and KW independently screened a 
sample of records by title, abstract and full text (see online 
supplementary text 2). The final list of included articles 
was approved by all authors.
data extraction, analysis and synthesis
Data were extracted in two steps. First, PB read all full 
texts and extracted the following basic data into an Excel 
(Microsoft) spreadsheet: study characteristics (authors, 
year, title, aims/objectives, policy focus, theory used, 
study design, methods, data sources, funding source); 
setting (focal nutrition issue, geographical level, jurisdic-
tion name, income-level); outcomes (study conclusions/
key findings, commitment outcome). Second, studies 
were coded in  ATLAS. ti (Scientific Software GmbH) 
using a coding schema derived from the initial frame-
work and refined abductively using constant comparative 
analysis, whereby the coded concepts were confirmed, 
integrated, modified and/or added to through iterations 
of data analysis.21
Data were then synthesised. First, text associated 
with each code was read in situ by PB and summarised, 
including: (i) a definition of each factor, identified as 
what influenced commitment; (ii) the mechanism(s) 
associated with it, identified as underlying entities, 
structures or processes that transmitted a causal force 
between the factor and political commitment (either 
stated in the study or inferred)22 and (iii) cofactors that 
amplified, diminished and/or sustained the mechanism. 
On this basis, we defined ‘context’ as ‘underlying social, 
economic and physical phenomena’ influencing how 
the mechanism functioned to generate an outcome.23 
Second, any cofactors missed in the first step were identi-
fied using the  ATLAS. ti code cooccurrence tool.
Populating and modifying the framework
The synthesised data corresponding to modified or new 
factors were populated into the thematic categories of 
the framework to generate the final version.16 All authors 
reviewed iterations of the results and final tables.
results
description of included studies
A total of 75 studies were included (see online supple-
mentary text 3). There was an upsurge in publications 
per year in the 2006–2017 period, likely reflecting 
increased attention to nutrition’s political economy. By 
World Bank country income status, studies spanned 31 
(38%) high-income (HICs), 13 (16%) upper-middle-in-
come (UMICs), 22 (27%) lower-middle (LMICs) and 
15 (18%) low-income (LICs) countries. By issue, 6 (8%) 
focused on food security, 22 (30%) on general malnutri-
tion, 2 (3%) on micronutrient deficiencies, 28 (38%) on 
overweight/obesity and diet-related NCDs and 16 (22%) 
on undernutrition. Overweight/obesity and diet-related 
NCDs was the predominant focus in HICs and UMICs 
studies, and undernutrition in LMICs and LICs. Only 
one study explicitly focused on the double burden of 
malnutrition.
By jurisdictional level, 51 (68%) involved national 
jurisdictions, 17 (23%) subnational (region/province/
state) and 4 (5%) subnational (local/municipal). A 
small number involved multilevel jurisdictions; 2 (3%) 
national and subnational (regional) and 1 (1%) national 
and supranational. Twenty-five frameworks, theories 
and models were identified across the included studies. 
Ten (14%) used the multiple streams theory, 9 (12%) a 
governance framework, 6 (8%) framing theory, 6 (8%) 
Shiffman and Smith’s framework, 5 (7%) Clark’s policy 
science framework, 4 (5%) the advocacy coalition frame-
work and 4 (5%) the enabling environments for nutri-
tion framework (6%). Twenty-four (32%) adopted a 
theoretically pluralistic approach that integrated two or 
more theories.
Factors generating, sustaining and constraining political 
commitment
As described in table 3, a total of 18 factors were identi-
fied as driving commitment, organised into five themes: 
actors; institutions; political and societal contexts; knowl-
edge evidence and framing; and, capacities and resources. 
These were conceptualised as increasing or decreasing 
the probability of political commitment, rather than 
in terms of necessity or sufficiency.14 A more elaborate 
representation of these factors is given in  online supple-
mentary text 4, tables S4.1–S4.5. As demonstrated by the 
cofactors column in these tables, the determinants of 
commitment identified were dynamic, strongly interde-
pendent and context-dependent.
Actors
Irrespective of country-context, effective nutrition actor 
networks (NANs) (factor 1) generated commitment 
through inter alia advocacy and awareness-raising, framing 
nutrition problems and solutions (ie, norm promotion), 
generating data and evidence, coordinating policy devel-
opment, implementation and monitoring activities, 
building capacities and mobilising resources.24–47 Such 
networks varied widely in structure (formal vs informal), 
maturity (nascent vs highly evolved) and membership 
composition including parliamentarians, bureaucrats, 
academics, international agencies and civil society repre-
sentatives.24–47 Their effectiveness was enhanced in the 
context of high cohesion among members,29 30 32 40–47 
strong leadership44–46 and when possessing strategic 
and organisational capacities.25 29 37 43 48–50 Conflict and 
fragmentation within NANs was, however, frequently 
reported resulting from many topics of disagree-
ment.12 25 28 33 34 36 40 51
Nutrition leaders (factor 2), including those within and 
outside of government enabled commitment in many 
studies through establishing, unifying and mobilising 
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Table 3 Factors identified as driving political commitment for nutrition
Category Factor and description
Actors (1) Nutrition actor network (NAN) effectiveness: effectiveness of NANs, the individuals and 
organisations operating within a given jurisdiction who shared common principles, causal beliefs and/
or interest in tackling malnutrition and who acted collectively to do so.14 20 25
(2) Strength of leadership: presence of committed and politically savvy individuals, within or outside of 
government, recognised as strong champions for nutrition.7 14 20 26
(3) Civil society mobilisation: extent to which civil society groups mobilised to address malnutrition, 
including non-government organisations and social movements collectively representing the interests 
of citizens.7 14
(4) Supportive international actors: degree to which actors with an international scope of operations 
and/or membership initiated, championed and/or supported nutrition policy and programming 
responses.14 27
(5) Private sector interference: degree to which mobilised private interest groups undermined effective 
nutrition policy responses, including food producers, retailers, marketers and their representative peak 
bodies.28 74
Institutions (6) Strength of institutions: extent to which coordinating agencies and institutional systems mandated 
to address malnutrition were empowered to effectively coordinate multisector/multilevel responses and 
advocate for sustained attention and resources.7 14 53 60
(7) Effective vertical coordination: degree to which nutrition policies were effectively coordinated, 
implemented and monitored across levels of governance, particularly regarding the incentives of 
subnational actors to adopt, progress and benefit from central government policies.29 52 86 89
(8) Legislative, regulatory and policy frameworks: degree to which national nutrition policies, 
operational plans and enabling legislation were well-designed and enacted, and/or the alignment of 
nutrition objectives with broader policy agendas and regulatory frameworks.61 71 81
Political and societal 
contexts
(9) Supportive political administrations: degree to which members of the executive (eg, head of state, 
ministers), legislative (eg, parliamentarians) and administrative (eg, agency heads, senior officials) 
branches of government initiated and championed nutrition responses.12 30 52
(10) Societal conditions and focusing events: extent to which changing societal conditions (long-
duration phenomena) or focusing events (short-term processes) focused attention onto nutrition or 
closely related issues and presented opportunities or impediments to commitment-building.14 20 27 31 32
(11) Ideology and institutional norms: extent to which entrenched belief systems and practices 
predominant within political systems, policy-making institutions and/or in society-at-large, 
negatively skewed perceptions about malnutrition problems and undermined effective policy 
responses.15 20 25 28 48 94
Knowledge, evidence 
and framing
(12) Credible indicators and data systems: availability of credible indicators and high-quality data 
systems for monitoring nutrition problems, informing policy design, tracking progress and empowering 
accountability systems.7 14 15 52 53
(13) Evidence: extent to which robust evidence on the causes, manifestations and consequences 
of malnutrition and the efficacy and cost-effectiveness of interventions was available, clearly 
communicated and accepted.14 28 75
(14) Internal frame alignment: degree to which NANs were aligned around a common interpretation and 
narrative of a given malnutrition problem including its definition, magnitude, causes and solutions for 
resolving it.14 25 27 29 31
(15) External frame resonance: degree to which NANs publicly portrayed (ie, framed) nutrition problems 
and solutions in ways that resonated with and motivated action by external audiences, and countered 
the frames deployed by opponents.14 20 27 28 31 52
Capacities and 
resources
(16) Strategic capacities: degree to which NAN members possessed ‘soft-power’ skills including the 
capacity to generate consensus, resolve conflicts, respond to recurring opportunities and challenges, 
build strategic alliances, undertake strategic communications and related tasks.7 31
(17) Organisational capacities: degree to which NAN members possessed the technical knowledge 
and skills, administrative systems and human resources required to generate commitment, including 
through the effective management of nutrition policy and programming responses.7 15 24 31
(18) Financial resources: degree to which nutrition budgetary commitments and financing systems 
incentivised multisector/multilevel coordination, ensured successful policy implementation and created 
ownership and entitlements among political elites, policy-makers, citizens and other stakeholders.7 52
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NANs, championing policy ideas and engaging with 
decision-makers.15 24 29 32 36 41 44–46 52–59 They included 
advocates promoting external attention to nutrition, 
policy entrepreneurs (eg, who softened-up technical 
communities to political realities, built consensus 
and advocated policy ideas) and high-level political 
champions.12 24 26 27 40 41 43 44 46–49 54–57 59–64 Their leader-
ship was enhanced when possessing certain strategic 
capacities (eg, emotional intelligence, management, 
communication, negotiation and conflict management 
skills),24 26 31 36 41 43 45 46 54 55 they had the support of high-
level political champions26 54 55 and when elected or 
appointed into positions of authority (eg, as legislators or 
high-level bureaucrats).24 36 41 43 45 46 53 57 65
The mobilisation of civil society groups (factor 3), 
including a diversity of international and national 
non-governmental organisations and social move-
ments (eg, health-orientated, disease-specific, faith-
based, consumer-focused), was often integral to NAN 
formation, development and impact. Groups varied 
in their expertise, available resources and functional 
roles.26 27 29–32 45 46 52 53 62 66–69 Their activities included 
advocacy, awareness-raising and coalition-building, acting 
as an accountability mechanism (eg, by monitoring and 
reporting on government and other stakeholder activi-
ties), giving voice to the politically marginalised, delivering 
on-the-ground services and informing policy develop-
ment, monitoring and calibration.26 27 29–32 45 46 52 53 62 66–69 
Civil society impact was enhanced when supported by the 
media27 55 and international actors,29 53 70 and when inclu-
sive governance arrangements linked policy-makers with 
civil society groups and policy beneficiaries.30 42 45 48 52 53 64 71
In several LIC and MIC studies, supportive inter-
national actors (factor 4) enabled commitment by 
mobilising resources for policy, programming and 
capacity-building,29 48 52 55 61 63 72 providing technical assis-
tance and legitimacy to policy initiatives,12 26 43 44 60 and 
by advocating to governments.25 43 44 48 53 They included 
multilateral organisations (eg, World Health Orga-
nization, Unicef, World Bank), donor agencies (eg, 
United States Agency for International Development, 
United Kingdom's Department for International Devel-
opment) and global nutrition initiatives (eg, Scaling 
Up Nutrition).15 39 42–44 53 55 57 61 63 67 In some cases, 
policy and programming was almost entirely donor-
driven.61 63 72 The role of international actors was weak-
ened when their actions were misaligned with government 
priorities,24 25 31 52 when the absence of coherent govern-
ment policies, coordinating structures and accountability 
mechanisms encouraged donors to ‘go it alone’38 70 and 
when recipient governments became overdependent on 
donor financing.39 40 63
In many MIC and HIC studies, private sector inter-
ference (factor 5) impeded commitment for food 
regulations targeting obesity prevention by inter alia 
undermining policy debates (eg, by emphasising indi-
vidual or parental responsibility, disputing evidence, 
intervention as ‘nanny-statist’), pre-emptively adopting 
self-regulation (ie, policy substitution) and direct 
lobbying of policy-makers.28 35 36 73–80 This was enhanced 
in the context of a neoliberal ideology28 35 73 81–83 including 
a shift towards hybrid (ie, public-private) governance 
arrangements that expanded private-interest influence 
in public policy,28 35 73 79 82 84 the food industry’s ‘produc-
tivist power’ as suppliers of jobs and tax revenue28 35 53 
and greater international capital mobility (ie, via trade 
liberalisation) allowing transnational corporations to 
punish or reward governments for their policy deci-
sions.56 79 In some LIC and MIC studies, agricultural 
subsidies, tax concessions and ‘pork-barrelling’ may have 
created powerful private-interest constituencies resisting 
nutrition-sensitive agriculture and food distribution 
policy change.27 52 61 70 85
Institutions
Tackling malnutrition requires coordinated action and 
commitment within and across multiple sectors (hori-
zontal coordination) and levels (vertical coordination) 
of governance. The complex institutional arrange-
ments involved, the absence of institutional ownership 
for nutrition, and institutional failure often impeded 
this.15 24 26 27 40 45 48 52 60 61 67 The establishment of empow-
ered coordinating agencies and institutional systems with 
a mandate to address malnutrition (factor 6) was impor-
tant in overcoming these challenges through inter alia 
providing structures for convening stakeholders, coor-
dinating multisector/multilevel policy development, 
implementation and monitoring activities and mobilising 
human, technical and financial resources.25 27 30 40 43 44 52 55 60 
This often centrally involved the health and agricultural 
sectors, but also inter alia education, gender, labour, 
finance, economic development, industry, water and sani-
tation, social protection and trade.24 30 44 50 52 59–61 67 69 86–88
Coordinating agencies were typically located within 
suprasectoral agencies (eg, office of the prime minister) 
or line agencies (eg, ministry of health, agricul-
ture),27 43 44 53 and embedded within wider multisector/
multilevel institutional systems with delineated roles and 
responsibilities.24 30 43 45 53 Agencies were more often effec-
tive when positioned suprasectorally and possessing suffi-
cient capacities, resources and leadership,12 24 53 55 67 69 
and when institutional systems had strong multisector/
multilevel cooperation incentives (eg, enabling legisla-
tion, policies and plans, shared and sector-specific goals, 
performance measures and performance and/or results-
based budgeting systems).43 53 61 67 71 Institutional failure 
resulted from inter alia insufficient authority, capacities 
and resources (often when located within politically weak 
line ministries),27 39 43 52 53 61 69 70 an overfocus on tech-
nical or implementation activities to the neglect of advo-
cacy24 53 60 and interorganisational competition.24 39 60
Vertical coordination presented a significant chal-
lenge given the many actors involved in policy and 
programming activities within and across levels of gover-
nance.12 24 25 28 29 39 52 61 63 69 72 76 86 89 90 Effective vertical 
coordination (factor 7) was important for incentivising 
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actions, building ownership and driving coordinated 
action along national to subnational ‘implementation 
pathways’.29 52 53 63 71 86 89 This was enhanced through 
strong cooperation incentives (eg, legislation requiring 
multilevel cooperation, resource transfers and perfor-
mance and/or results-based budgeting),52 53 71 and 
subnational institutional structures with sufficient capac-
ities and resources.29 52 53 63 Decentralisation processes 
underway in many countries increased the power of 
subnational stakeholders, making their involvement in 
centralised policy processes critical,25 49 52 53 60 63 and their 
exclusion detrimental.38 52 61 63 67 In some cases, decen-
tralisation also undermined the authority of centralised 
coordinating agencies.25 39 43 49 60 63
The development and adoption of national nutri-
tion policies, operational plans and enabling legisla-
tion (factor 8) enabled commitment by demonstrating 
commitments to which governments could be held 
accountable, enabling beliefs on the need for coordinated 
action within government, and by providing a framework 
for action.15 46 53 61 63 67 69 71 Commitment was further 
enhanced when nutrition was positioned within broader 
national development plans, social welfare reforms 
and/or poverty reduction strategies,24 29 45 53 56 66 when 
global-level policies and/or commitments compelled 
national governments to initiate responses42 43 52 57 63 91 
and when policies had clear numerical commitments that 
enhanced accountability.52 61 92 It was diminished when 
nutrition was excluded or marginalised from broader 
policy agendas,60 61 93 and when there was limited capacity 
to achieve consensus among stakeholders during policy 
processes.15 31 37 64
Political and societal contexts
Political administrations, including the executive, legis-
lative and administrative branches of government were 
often the primary power structures shaping nutrition 
responses at all levels. Supportive political administra-
tions (factor 9) enabled commitment by articulating 
policy debates, championing policy initiatives, facilitating 
inclusive policy processes (eg, public consultations), 
drafting policy and legislation, providing institutional 
memory and enhancing accountability through oversight 
of policy initiatives, agencies and expenditures.12 29 30 45 52 
This was more likely with the election or electoral conti-
nuity of governments with strong social welfare and anti-
poverty agendas,12 24 27 38 42 45 52 53 55 56 71 when actions were 
taken to build non-partisan (ie, multiparty or multifac-
tion) coalitions for nutrition and when parliamentarians 
were actively involved in policy processes.30 43 52
Unsupportive political administrations were frequently 
reported.25 29 38 45 52 55 61 69 83 93 In several cases, rhetor-
ical commitments by members of the executive branch 
were not converted into directives for legislative and 
administrative enactment.15 24 52 53 70 This was more likely 
in the context of weak electoral demand and/or civil 
society pressure (ie, reducing the political costs of inac-
tion),25 38 45 52 55 61 69 93 the low-level visibility of nutrition 
and poor nutritional literacy among parliamentarians, 
administrators and citizens,15 38 39 49 63 66 when attention 
to nutrition was eclipsed by more tangible ‘vote-winning’ 
issues24 38 40 42 43 49 60 61 63 67 and in highly partisan, frag-
mented or unstable political environments.38 90 In some 
HIC studies, commitment for food regulations targeting 
obesity prevention was undermined by the election of, 
or congressional control by, more right-wing (eg, liber-
al-conservative) governments.28 35 36 58
Long-term changes in societal conditions and short-
term focusing events (factor 11) presented opportunities 
or challenges for generating commitment by influencing 
many aspects of government policy agendas and by 
focusing public and political attention directly onto or 
away from nutrition and/or closely related issues.27 31 32 64 
Examples of these are given in table 4. Some focusing 
events (eg, famines) were detrimental when they focused 
attention onto and institutionalised food production 
and distribution responses at the expense of broader (ie, 
nutrition-sensitive) and longer-term responses to under-
nutrition.31 Changing societal conditions and focusing 
events were more likely to advance commitment when 
NANs had sufficient foresight, leadership and capacities 
to take advantage of emerging opportunities or mitigate 
threats.31 64
Certain belief systems (factor 12) entrenched within 
political systems, policy-making institutions and/or in 
society-at-large were found to narrow or skew perceptions 
about the scale, scope and nature of nutrition problems, 
thereby impeding commitment for more balanced policy 
responses addressing the wider determinants of malnutri-
tion.15 25 28 48 82 94 Three were most evident as described in 
table 5. In primarily HIC studies, a ‘neoliberal ideology’ 
was found to skew overweight/obesity responses towards 
behavioural-lifestyle and market-driven (ie, industry-led) 
approaches with a limited role for government and legis-
lative intervention.28 32 35 56 73 81–83 In several LIC and 
MICs, a ‘food-centric’ belief system was found to orien-
tate policy responses towards agricultural production, 
food distribution and hunger reduction to the exclusion 
of nutrition.13 15 27 31 49 53 55 61 63 68 69 93 A ‘nutricentric’ belief 
system skewed undernutrition responses towards nutri-
tion-specific and/or curative/biomedical interventions 
to the neglect of nutrition-sensitive ones.38 44 52 53 61 63
Knowledge, evidence and framing
Irrespective of issue or country-context, the availability of 
credible indicators and data systems (factor 12) was crit-
ical to enabling commitment by informing problem iden-
tification (ie, demonstrating the changing prevalence 
and distribution of malnutrition), policy development, 
monitoring and calibration activities, the development of 
internal frame alignment (ie, a shared discourse) within 
NANs, and as a foundation for effective financing and 
accountability systems.12 15 26–31 40 43 44 52–55 57 59 66 68 75 76 90 Data 
demonstrating ‘policy success’ enabled successful advo-
cacy efforts for sustaining long-term commitment.24 40 44 49 90 
Insufficient data and weak data systems were, however, 
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reported in many studies,26 27 31 33 37 38 40 60 61 63 83 84 86 92 
often resulting from the limited capacities, resources and 
incentives of nutrition actors to collect, analyse and 
disseminate data.40 42 52 61 69 72 93
Evidence demonstrating the causes and consequences 
of malnutrition and the efficacy and cost-effectiveness 
of interventions (factor 13) helped to support effective 
advocacy and policy activities when available, clearly 
communicated and accepted.30 32 43 44 47 53 62 66 71 This 
was more likely when evidence was communicated via 
‘knowledge-brokers’26 42 56 69 95 in language policy-makers 
understand,61 69 95 by using communicative devices (eg, 
Table 4 Changing societal conditions and focusing events as commitment-building opportunities or challenges
Type Identified examples presenting opportunities (↑) or challenges (↓)
Societal conditions: Long-duration 
phenomena that influenced 
many aspects of government 
policy agendas that were 
directly or indirectly related to 
nutrition.31 32
↑ Long-term trends in population health, food systems change and nutrition status (eg, 
epidemiological transition, nutrition transition)28 37 57; ↑ transition to democracy enabling 
more socially orientated policies45 66; ↑ economic growth enabling greater resources for 
nutrition budgetary commitments.27 55 ↓ Sustained conflict/insecurity39 44 70 91 100; ↓ weak 
government revenue-raising capacity constraining nutrition budgetary commitments27 52 58 68 70; 
↓ widespread corruption and embezzlement27 52 68; ↓ economic downturn/austerity reducing 
support for food regulations targeting obesity prevention due to perceived costs/impacts on 
food industry.28 32 34 58
Focusing events: short-duration 
processes that focused 
attention directly onto nutrition 
or indirectly by association 
with closely related issues.27 31
↑ Famines, natural disasters, political upheavals and economic crises15 31 39 55 63 64 91; ↑ high-
profile and/or consistent media coverage12 27 36 41 55 63 68 69 73 75 84; ↑↓ political developments 
including changes within the executive, legislative and/or administrative branches of 
government, government planning cycles, high-level speeches/debates and ratifying 
international agreements12 14 20 27 28 30 56 57 61; ↑ emergence of broader policy discourses that 
nutrition actors could sensitise (eg, HIV/AIDS, Millennium Development Goal implementation, 
primary healthcare, poverty reduction)31 55 59; ↑ direct actions of nutrition actors (eg, high-
profile events, publishing reports).15 27 43 ↓ Famines, natural disasters, political upheavals, 
economic downturn and other crises when institutionalising food distribution responses that 
excluded nutrition.31
Table 5 Prominent belief systems skewing nutrition responses and undermining commitment
Belief system Reinforcing or associated factors
Neoliberalism: an ideology emphasising 
market freedom, minimal government 
intervention, devolved governance 
including ‘self-governance’ by the 
individual and an expanded role for 
market actors in all spheres of political, 
economic and social activity.73 82
Behavioural-lifestyle approaches to nutrition that download responsibility onto 
individuals or parents rather than powerful governments and/or food industry 
actors28 32 35 56 73 82; an expanded role for the private sector in policy and 
governance28 35 73 82; belief that government should have no or only a minimal role 
in regulating free markets and enterprise28 35 73 81 83; deregulation agendas within 
government including regulatory impact assessments (ie, assessing new regulatory 
proposals for costs to business) with stringent evidential requirements.80 81
Nutricentrism: a curative, biomedical 
or nutrient-centric view of nutrition 
emphasising nutrition-specific or 
reductionist interventions to the neglect 
of integrated, preventative or nutrition-
sensitive ones.38 44 52 53 61
Placement of nutrition within ministries of health resulting in an overemphasis on 
nutrition-specific programming38 44 52 61 63; prevailing narratives at international 
level (ie, nutrition faddism) narrowing the scope of national nutrition responses 
(eg, overemphasis on micronutrients)31; civil society groups becoming fixated on 
single issues and presenting ideological resistant to alternatives27 38; generally, 
an overly technical or reductionist approach to nutrition disconnected from the 
messiness of real decision-making, particularly when nutrition actors failed to 
manage conflicts arising from divergent values, perspectives or interests of a non-
technical nature.12 24 27 37
Food-centrism: the conflation of ‘malnutrition 
with lack of food’.31 pS62 Also described 
as the 'conflation of food security with 
nutrition security' or the conflation of 
a ‘commitment to fight hunger with 
combatting undernutrition’.13p280
Focusing events (eg, drought, famine, economic crises) that stimulated and 
institutionalised food distribution and emergency food responses at the expense of 
long-term development nutrition26 52 61; when food distribution and/or food pricing 
was an entrenched political issue (ie, when perceived as a ‘vote-winner’ or food 
insecurity as driving political instability), and when food distribution schemes were 
highly institutionalised and resistant to change (ie, path dependent)27 31 38 39 45 70; 
when food systems were orientated towards the production and distribution 
of single commodities (eg, rice in Bangladesh, maize in Zambia) thus creating 
powerful electoral constituencies resisting nutrition-sensitive policy change52 61 70; 
overemphasis on agricultural commercialisation, cash-cropping and/or export 
markets (ie, productivism) to the neglect of local social considerations and 
nutritional needs.61 89
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country profiles, short briefs, nutrition maps)53 69 and 
when authoritative bodies were commissioned to gather, 
integrate and report evidence.33 47 71 The perception 
that evidence was lacking, inconsistent or unconvincing 
was frequently reported.12 27 28 33 37 40 56 61 63 69 75 76 80 81 84 95 
Although in some studies a strong international evidence-
base supported country-level activities,26 33 40 42 43 66 
many reported an absence of locally relevant evidence 
and/or the perception that international/national 
evidence was inapplicable to national/subnational 
contexts.26 27 31 33 37 40 63 83 84 86 Higher evidential require-
ments were needed to inform policy decisions when 
issues were strongly contested, as in the case of food regu-
lations targeting obesity prevention.28 35 75 84
NANs that were unified around a common problem 
definition, causal interpretation and set of proposed solu-
tions (factor 14) were more likely to overcome ideological 
differences, appease powerful ‘veto players’ and under-
take effective collective action.15 25 29–31 40 43 46 55 59 69 71 This 
was more likely when NANs had established structures (eg, 
governance bodies, conferences, workshops, informal 
networking events) for sharing information, recruiting 
and socialising new members, building consensus and 
managing conflicts,25 29 37 43 48–50 52 55 71 leadership,37 44 52 
strategic capacities (ie, soft skills) for building consensus 
and managing conflicts31 37 40 44 and credible data, evidence 
and/or a shared causal framework (eg, Unicef nutrition 
framework) to support a unifying discourse.37 44 52 The 
failure to achieve this ‘internal frame alignment’ was 
reported in many cases12 27 28 36–39 44 49 53 56 61 68 70 83–85 96 and 
resulted more often from normative conflicts (eg, diver-
gent interests, organisational mandates, administrative 
systems or professional cultures) rather than technical 
ones.24 25 27 31 37 49 64 Although there were many topics of 
disagreement within NANs,31 37 52 distrust and disagree-
ment regarding the private sector’s role in nutrition 
policy was most common.12 26 27 32 37 40 78 96
Certain public portrayals (ie, frames) used by nutri-
tion actors to attribute causality, responsibility, severity, 
tractability and benefit to an issue were found to 
resonate strongly with external audiences and thus 
enable commitment.14 20 28 86 Common frames identi-
fied are described in table 6. This ‘external frame reso-
nance’ (factor 14) was more likely when messages were 
aligned with the underlying values and beliefs of policy 
decision-makers7 28 43 48 77 including their perceptions 
of technical and political feasibility,12 24 27 48 when NANs 
argued behind closed doors and spoke with a common 
voice31 43 52 and when messages were strategically tailored 
to align with the priorities, interests and needs of target 
audiences.7 50 77 83 95 ‘Hooking’ nutrition onto high priority 
non-nutrition issues (ie, frame expansion) was also found 
to successfully enable ‘nutrition success without nutrition 
commitment’ by sensitising broader policy agendas (eg, 
national development agendas, poverty reduction initia-
tives, school feeding programmes) to nutrition objec-
tives.30 31 49 52 53 59
Capacities and resources
NANs possessing strategic capacities (factor 16), 
described as ‘a body of craft knowledge with consider-
able practical utility'31 pS63 were more capable of building 
cohesive NANs, responding to opportunities and coun-
tering threats, and managing complex political and 
policy processes.15 24 31 43 44 46 47 55 57 90 At the individual 
level, this included certain attributes of nutrition leaders 
(see factor 2) and at the institutional level the capacity 
for building consensus, managing conflicts and devel-
oping competencies,25 29 31 37 43 44 48–50 establishing and 
maintaining strategic multistakeholder partnerships (ie, 
coalition-building)40 44 46 48 52 53 62 and undertaking stra-
tegic communication. The latter included the capacity to 
negotiate, compromise and tailor messages to different 
audiences,7 24 31 36 48 52 55 57 advocate for incremental/
realistic changes aligned with decision-maker priori-
ties25 30 43 49 53 77 83 and to use champions with direct access 
to policy-makers.41 43 46 49 52 In several studies, weak stra-
tegic capacities were reported as problematic.12 24 27 28 36 61
Limited organisational capacities (factor 17) 
frequently undermined commitment by constraining 
Table 6 Frames identified in the literature
Type Identified examples
Frames generating attention and/
or enabling commitment
An economic rationale for intervention including costs to national health systems, 
economic development and productivity28 61 63 81 96; vulnerability of children to 
malnutrition27 28 71 77; the human right to food and health12 27 45 52 55; international 
comparisons highlighting the particular severity of malnutrition in a country12; food industry 
demonization28; increasing use of an obesogenic environment frame locating responsibility 
with the ‘causes of the causes’ of obesity and thus with a wider diversity of actors beyond 
the individual28 71 73; when societal conditions and focusing events (eg, drought, HIV/AIDS, 
health system reforms) provided an opportunity for strategically sensitising broader policy 
discourses to nutrition.31
Oppositional frames (overweight/
obesity)
Emphasis on individual/parental responsibility over governmental and industry 
responsibility, portraying scientific evidence as contested or inconclusive28 74 75 79; the 
‘singling-out’ of processed foods or beverages for intervention as unfair28 32 77 96; food 
regulation as undermining commercial viability28 32 56; government as a ‘nanny’ when 
intervening to address obesogenic food environments.28 35 73 77 94
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the effective management of nutrition policy responses 
and increasing the likelihood of policy failure (thus 
trapping nutrition within a low-priority cycle). This 
was most evident in cases where competent nutrition 
professionals and administrative staff were lacking, 
especially at the local level,24 40 42 43 46 52 61 63 67 70 72 86 91 93 
when there was a high turnover of ministers or admin-
istrative staff and/or disruptive administrative restruc-
turing,12 24 42 44 61 69 limited technical capacities particularly 
for multisectoral/multilevel data collection, management 
and analysis,40 42 52 61 69 72 93 when high administrative loads 
were placed on weak coordinating agencies and other 
relevant institutions38 48 52 55 63 68 70 72 and when absent or 
weak budgeting, record-keeping and accounting capaci-
ties undermined financial planning, programming effi-
ciency and accountability.48 52 63 68 70 72
The expansion of nutrition budgetary commitments 
and effective financing systems (factor 18) enabled 
commitment by empowering coordinating agencies 
and institutional systems, enabling effective policy 
implementation, and by creating entitlements among 
parliamentarians, bureaucrats and citizens.27 52 53 66 67 71 
Performance and/or results-based budgeting was effec-
tive at incentivising multisector/multilevel coopera-
tion, improving the transparency and accountability 
of institutional systems and enhancing the efficiency 
of programming activities.27 29 52 53 66 More generally, 
accountability was enhanced when there were trans-
parent financing and accounting systems for tracking 
disbursements.38 48 52 61 72 93 In many cases, inadequate 
financial resources or the failure to effectively use existing 
resources led to poor implementation outcomes and 
policy failure.24 38–40 43 46 48 49 52 61–63 67 68 70 72 90 91 93 Financing 
activities were undermined by a limited capacity of subna-
tional implementation partners to use or reciprocate 
funding from central government,12 52 62 the absence 
of nutrition line items in government budgets or the 
nesting of nutrition within budgets for non-mandated 
departments or issues63 67 72 and when siloed financing 
arrangements encouraged interagency competition and 
disincentivised cooperation.24 38 40 48 60 93
dIsCussIon
We used a theoretically driven review method to identify 
the determinants of political commitment for nutrition 
at the country-level. Overall, we identified and described 
18 factors organised into five themes: actors; institutions; 
political and societal contexts; knowledge, evidence and 
framing; and, capacities and resources. Many of the iden-
tified factors have been described previously in the liter-
ature on nutrition’s political economy’ The results affirm 
the findings of reviews on undernutrition in low-income 
and middle-income countries,8 9 12 and on nutrition and 
obesity in middle-income and high-income countries.11 97 
Similar themes have been found in global and suprana-
tional studies.88 98 We have, however, extended this work 
in two notable ways.
First, we integrated the nutrition politics and policy 
literature relevant to ‘malnutrition in all its forms’, thus 
spanning all issues and country-contexts. Although the 
included studies were not always directly comparable 
(due to differences in study design, theoretical focus 
and methods used), many of the determinants of polit-
ical commitment were similar across issues and contexts. 
Irrespectively, effective nutrition actor networks, strong 
leadership, civil society mobilisation, supportive polit-
ical administrations, changing societal conditions and 
focusing events, cohesive and resonant framing, and data 
systems and evidence were commitment drivers.
There were some notable exceptions, likely reflecting 
the focus of distinct bodies of researchers working in 
different country-contexts. For example, factors within 
the ‘institutions’ and ‘capacities and resources’ themes 
were almost exclusively reported in low-income and 
middle-income country studies, although these are very 
likely to be important in high-income countries. Private 
sector interference was reported as impeding policy 
responses to obesity and diet-related NCDs exclusively 
in upper-middle-income and high-income countries. 
Nonetheless, these findings suggest that addressing 
malnutrition in all its forms is likely to require some core 
types of commitment-building activities, but with some 
context-dependent adaptations.
Second, previous reviews have listed and described 
relevant factors but have neither elaborated on their 
interactions nor elaborated significantly on the role 
of context. Our results demonstrate that the determi-
nants of political commitment for nutrition are strongly 
interdependent, context-dependent and dynamic, thus 
demonstrating systems-like features. This supports the 
need and provides a foundation for understanding 
the drivers of political commitment, and arguably the 
political economy of nutrition more generally, within a 
non-linear and dynamic model of change.52 Qualitative 
system-dynamics modelling could be used to generate 
such a model and elaborate on the functioning of ‘food 
and nutrition political economy systems’. In this perspec-
tive, the effects of interactions among factors are likely to 
be significantly greater than the sum of their individual 
effects in isolation.99
Future research directions
Although in recent decades a rich and growing litera-
ture on the political economy of nutrition has emerged, 
many evidence gaps remain. In this section we explore a 
number of these.
Theoretically, the broad repertoire of frameworks, 
theories and models used across the literature has 
provided multiple lenses through which to understand 
this complex topic. Arguably, studies using comprehen-
sive and theoretically pluralistic frameworks15 20 38 have 
generated deeper insights into the functioning of food 
and nutrition political economy systems as a whole, than 
those focused on certain facets (eg, framing) or policy 
process stages (eg, agenda-setting). Overall, we found 
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the theory-driven framework synthesis method well 
suited to our aim of understanding a complex political 
phenomenon. However, empirical evidence in theoreti-
cally guided research is always generated, at least to some 
extent, by the theory itself. Thus, we may have missed 
important drivers of political commitment because they 
have been undertheorised and thus under-reported in 
the literature. Indeed, important approaches in political 
science (eg, new institutionalism) are largely absent and 
provide avenues for guiding future investigation.
Substantively, there are many research questions in 
need of answers of which some—given their cross-cutting 
nature—are arguably most important. Several concern 
nutrition actor networks. How do such networks form, 
evolve and become effective? What pragmatic actions 
can be taken to rapidly enhance their effectiveness 
within countries? Several institutionalised belief systems 
(eg, food-bias, nutricentrism) are strong commitment 
barriers. Why have these become institutionalised in 
some jurisdictions but not others? How might these be 
countered? Very few studies have focused on the reality 
that NANs concerned with obesity tend to be different 
to those concerned with undernutrition. What oppor-
tunities does bringing together people and entities 
concerned with different forms of malnutrition present 
for furthering commitment to nutrition, especially as 
new institutional systems and policies for tackling over-
weight/obesity and diet-related NCDs are layered onto 
existing ones for undernutrition? The role of parliamen-
tarians is also underexplored.52 How can non-partisan 
support for nutrition be attained and sustained more 
systematically at this level? Private sector interference is 
reported to have strongly impeded commitment for over-
weight/obesity and diet-related NCD prevention. How 
can NANs more effectively counteract this interference, 
while recognising that the private sector will inevitably 
have to be involved in delivering on objectives?
ConClusIon
In this review we asked: what factors generate, sustain and 
constrain political commitment for nutrition at national 
and subnational levels, how and under what circum-
stances? Our aim was to inform strategic actions for 
building commitment over the United Nations Decade 
of Action on Nutrition. Overall, 18 factors were identified 
organised into five themes: actors; institutions; political 
and societal contexts; knowledge, evidence and framing; 
and, capacities and resources. The results demonstrate 
that the processes driving commitment are multifacto-
rial, dynamic and strongly context-dependent. Further-
more, commitment is not something that simply exists or 
emerges accidentally; it can be created and strengthened 
over time through strategic action.9
Many of the divers of political commitment are similar 
irrespective of country-context or nutrition issue, but 
with some notable exceptions. This suggests that effective 
commitment-building strategies are likely to involve a set 
of core actions but with some context-dependent adapta-
tions. The main core action identified through this study 
is sustained commitment-building actions by cohesive, 
responsive and strongly led nutrition actor networks. 
Accelerating the development of such networks should 
be a core task for all actors involved, including inter-
national development partners. To achieve their goals, 
nutrition actor networks should aim to enrol the support 
of political leaders, parliamentarians and administra-
tive elites and mobilise civil society coalitions. To sustain 
commitment, they must establish empowered institu-
tions, develop organisational and strategic capacities, 
generate commitment among implementation partners 
at all levels and mobilise the financial resources to do so.
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